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AuthenticationAbstract The veracity of a message from a sensor node must be veriﬁed in order to avoid a false
reaction by the sink. This veriﬁcation requires the authentication of the source node. The authen-
tication process must also preserve the privacy such that the node and the sensed object are not
endangered. In this work, a ring signature was proposed to authenticate the source node while pre-
serving its spatial privacy. However, other nodes as signers and their numbers must be chosen to
preclude the possibility of a trafﬁc analysis attack by an adversary. The spatial uncertainty increases
with the number of signers but requires larger memory size and communication overhead. This
requirement can breach the privacy of the sensed object. To determine the effectiveness of the pro-
posed scheme, the location estimate of a sensor node by an adversary and enhancement in the loca-
tion uncertainty with a ring signature was evaluated. Using simulation studies, the ring signature
was estimated to require approximately four members from the same neighbor region of the source
node to sustain the privacy of the node. Furthermore, the ring signature was also determined to
have a small overhead and not to adversely affect the performance of the sensor network.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.1. Introduction
Nodes in a wireless sensor network (WSN) observe their
environment and send their observations to the sink (Mahmoud
and Xuemin, 2012). The sensor data are characterized by their
critical nature and spatial signiﬁcance. The data sensed by a sen-sor node need to be sent to the base station via a secure commu-
nication channel. Networks can be either event-driven or time-
driven.Whenever a message is propagated through the network
to the sink in an event-driven network,message authentication is
imperative both in terms of data origin and content. Authentica-
tion (Daojing et al., 2011) helps to verify whether the source
information has been tampered with or if a node has masquer-
aded as the source node and sent its own version of the message.
Adversaries in the network can monitor the broadcast (Yang
et al., 2011) by sensor nodes. These adversaries can obtain the
time of an event based on the communication patterns, location
of events and nodes from the message ﬂow and see the unen-
crypted contents of the messages.
Using these methods, adversaries can construct the topol-
ogy of the network, node deployment details and track the spa-
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crypted, adversaries can learn about the network by recreating
the context from the temporal and spatial ﬂow of messages.
This process compromises the security and privacy of the net-
work and most importantly the sensed object. This compro-
mise may be used in a malicious manner. For example
(Chow et al., 2011), poachers may track an animal moving
in a forest by breaching both the spatial and temporal privacy
of the sensed animal by monitoring the messages in the net-
work. To protect the privacy of the sensed object, the spatial
information from the messages along with temporal informa-
tion that yield the time of occurrence of events must be cloaked
(Chan and Perrig, 2003).
In WSN, sensor nodes are deployed in a region that is in
close proximity to the event to be observed and interact with
their physical environment and other nodes. These regions of
deployment are usually accessible, and sensed objects may be
sensitive. The observation of an event of interest and commu-
nication of this information makes the sensed object suscepti-
ble to physical attacks by compromising its privacy. During
transmission, the message payload that contains the observa-
tions and other spatial–temporal information is encrypted to
guarantee conﬁdentiality. The header is in clear text and con-
tains the identity of the origin, routing information, etc. The
adversary is protocol and deployment-aware. It contains infor-
mation of the topology and current communication in the net-
work. An adversary can eavesdrop on communication, read
the clear text header information and obtain the identity of
the source. However, we assume that the adversary is non-
intrusive and does not interfere in the functioning of the net-
work. It does not inject or modify messages, compromise sen-
sor nodes or change routing paths. These passive local
adversaries may collude themselves over covert channels to ob-
tain global information of the topology and communication
and act globally as global adversaries. In a WSN, nodes are
densely deployed, and an event usually occurs in the sensing
regions of multiple nodes. Therefore, multiple nodes report
an event. The adversary receives the broadcasts, examines
the clear text header information to obtain the authentication
information and source identity. Trafﬁc analysis yields the
approximate location of the nodes and sensed event. The map-
ping of the node identities with their location information can
breach the privacy of the nodes and thus, the privacy of the
sensed event. Therefore, the problem consists of obfuscating
this mapping by hiding the node identities without hindering
the authentication process. In this work, we concentrated on
a mechanism to protect network’s spatial context, such that
the location of an event’s occurrence cannot be garnered from
the information available from messages or message ﬂows. For
example, in wild life monitoring, an adversary who can associ-
ate the time and place of origin of messages with the movement
behavior of the animal can track a target animal. Thus, break-
ing the association of message ﬂows from the location is imper-
ative for sustaining the privacy of static or mobile sensed
objects. Context-sensitive data can be secured in two ways:
securing the location of sensor nodes and data sources or hid-
ing the time at which an event is generated. To sustain the pri-
vacy (Jian et al., 2008) of the event or the nodes, the data
(sensed data or data in messages) and the source of data (event
or sensor node) must be protected by blurring the information
and de-correlating the data from the location and time ofoccurrence. In this study, we employed a ring signature to pre-
serve the spatial privacy of the sensed object and nodes.
This privacy is achieved by hiding the identity of the report-
ing sensor node in the crowd of other nodes to obfuscate the
location of the data origin. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 describes the work related to the present
study. The spatial privacy scheme is discussed and proposed in
Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 contains the results
with conclusion in Section 6.2. Related work
Sensor networks feature two privacy concerns, data-oriented
and context-oriented privacy. Data-oriented privacy (Jian
et al., 2008) deals with securing the integrity of data gathered
and transmitted to the destination. Context-oriented privacy
(Tavli et al., 2010) prevents adversaries form gaining access
to data context information, such as the time and location
from which, the data originated. Data-oriented privacy focuses
on proving protection to data items. Attackers can corrupt or
eavesdrop on data to obtain critical information or inject false
information in the network. A passive adversary eavesdrops
(Kamat et al., 2005) on communication between nodes to
determine the location of nodes or tracks the evolution of
events. Cryptographic schemes can mitigate this type of unlaw-
ful behavior. Active malicious nodes can inject polluted infor-
mation into the network through these nodes. The main focus
of context-oriented privacy is to ensure the privacy of context
related information, such as the location and time. The loca-
tion can refer to the node location or data origin location. If
an adversary can detect the location of a sink or the area,
where an event has occurred, it can breach the privacy of infor-
mation. It may also track (Kamat et al., 2007) or compromise
a sensitive critical target.
The problem of privacy preservation (Alfantookh, 2006) is
addressed by perturbing the parameters that are monitored.
The underlying probability distributions are changed such that
deﬁnite patterns cannot be constructed from the perturbed
data and the relationships between different entities are uncor-
related. Increasing the entropy also increases privacy (Mehta
et al., 2007) by enhancing the crowd size or the diversity. This
enhancement can be achieved by employing cryptographic or
non-cryptographic mechanisms. Various non-cryptographic
mechanisms (Sabto and Al Mutib, 2013) have been studied
in the literature. Random walk (Lu et al., 2013) has been used
in Phantom routing (Li et al., 2012), and randomized routing
(Al-Muhtadi, 2007) has been used along with ﬂooding to hide
the location of the source. Fake message injection (Li and Ren,
2009) and path perturbation algorithms (Rabai et al., 2013) are
also used to randomize trafﬁc patterns and reduce the proba-
bility of tracking mobile targets. The data are aggregated, or
their coarseness is increased. Techniques to increase coarseness
associated with location details have also been proposed (Hu
et al., 2007). Cryptographic techniques (Islam and Biswas,
2013) for privacy complement non-cryptographic techniques,
such as routing, virtual ring creation, etc. The choice of cryp-
tographic technique is important, as it consumes resources of
the network. This consumption may adversely affect the la-
tency, throughput and network lifetime. Many approaches
provide the privacy of nodes and data; while ensuring efﬁcient
resource consumption. A new time efﬁcient source privacy
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Figure 1 Anonymity zone (Z) (location of source is known).
230 A. Debnath et al.scheme, TESP2, against the trafﬁc analysis attack of a global
eavesdropper that can monitor and analyze the trafﬁc in the
entire network has been proposed (Chen et al., 2012). In
TESP2, a sensor node broadcasts a request for timed data
collection to its upstream nodes. Each upstream node sends
the cipher text of the real data or else sends the cipher text
of the dummy data if it lacks any real data. To preserve the
source privacy, the sensor node will discard any dummy data,
re-encrypt and forward the cipher text of the real data to the
downstream nodes.
3. Spatial privacy
We consider the sensors (S= {S1, S2, S3, . . ., Sx}) to be de-
ployed where x is the population of the deployed sensors.
Nodes are assumed to be deployed in a uniform random distri-
bution. Prior to deployment, each sensor is assumed to be
loaded with a public/private key pair (Pi, Si) for (i= 1, 2, 3,
4, ..., x). Among the available public key cryptosystems, we as-
sume the use of ID-based public key cryptography. Local
adversaries and global adversaries exist. The local adversary
has limited access to the network information and can monitor
trafﬁc from its one-hop neighbors. Unlike the local adversary,
the global adversary can contain information related to the en-
tire network. It has the capability to monitor the entire net-
work as well as access the local adversary. Local adversaries
can also collude and provide information to the global
adversaries.
3.1. Location uncertainty
In WSN, nodes are randomly scattered over a speciﬁc area
such that each point in the region is within the sensing range
of at least one node. The locations of the nodes in this random
network follow a spatial stochastic distribution. This arrange-
ment is usually taken to be a homogenous Poisson point pro-
cess of density ðkÞ, and the number of nodes in any set A of
Lebesgue measure (|X|) is Poisson with mean ðkjXjÞ. However,
when the number of nodes deployed in a region is ﬁxed, the
Poisson point process is not a good representation of the node
distribution. The model may give more nodes than actually
present, especially when the number of nodes is small. When
a ﬁxed and ﬁnite (say N) number of nodes are independent
and identically distributed in a region, the point process is
binomial. When (N) points in a compact set (W) are distrib-
uted independently and uniformly, the process is a binomial
point process. For any subset (X W), the number of points
in (X) is binomial (n, p) with parameters (n= N) and
(p= |X \W|/|W|). The occurrence of event of interest or
sensed object that lies in the sensing region of sensor nodes
triggers communication from these nodes. A message emanat-
ing from a source node report on an event is heard by adver-
saries within the node’s communication range. An individual
adversary or adversaries can collude to obtain a rough esti-
mate of the location of the sensed object. This estimated zone
(Z) is the anonymity zone. The level of anonymity of a sensed
object or event is the inability of the adversary to pinpoint its
location in the anonymity zone (Z). The degree of anonymity
of the sensed event is a function of the location uncertainty of
the sensor node reporting the event. This degree of anonym-
ity is in turn proportional to the area of the anonymityzone (A(Z)). If (pi) is the probability that the event occurs
at a given point in (Z), then ðPpi¼1Þ. The entropy (Yu and
Guan, 2008) of the distribution of the anonymity set is
HðpÞ ¼ PAðZÞi¼1 pilog2pi
 
. The anonymity of a given event is
maximized when all points are equally likely to be the potential
point of occurrence of the event of interest. Under this uniform
distribution, the probability (pi) that a point (Z) under obser-
vation is the target becomes pi / 1AðZÞAðZÞ W
 
.
Following the deﬁnition of the level of the anonymity given
in Yu and Guan (2008), we have, (Al = 1  1/|A(Z)|) with en-
tropy (H(p) = log2 A(Z)). The entropy of the anonymity set
is the measure of the privacy of a sensed object or event. If the
events form a binomial point process, then the events of inter-
est would be binomially distributed in the area (A(Z)).
The probability ðpkzÞ that (k) events of interest of the point
process occur in the region (Z) is deﬁned as the probability of
(k) points being in an arbitrary set (Z). If (N) nodes are distrib-







In WSN, an event of interest may be observed by more than
one sensor node. An adversary in the network may be aware
of the node deployment or may not be aware of the node loca-
tions. A deployment-unaware adversary gauges the location of
the nodes from the signals broadcast by the nodes. A deploy-
ment-aware adversary knows the locations of the sensor nodes.
3.1.1. Case I: The adversary is deployment aware
3.1.1.1. The source is known. A sensor node observes an event
and transmits a message to report the event to the sink. The
broadcast is received by an adversary, who is in the communi-
cation range (Rc) of the sensor node. The adversary receives
the message and reads the contents of the clear text header
to ﬁnd the source of the communication. The event of interest
must lie in the sensing range (Rs) of this source sensor node. To
ensure communication connectivity (RcP 2Rs), the location of
the event must be within a circular region centered at the sen-
sor node with radius (Rs). This range is the anonymity zone (Z)
for the event. The event of interest would be located in the un-
ion of sensing range of all the sensor nodes in (Z). Hence, its
privacy is proportional to the number of nodes that are in
(Z). The adversary who has heard the broadcast is sure that
at least one node is present in (Z), which is shown in Fig. 1.
The probability that (k) more nodes are present (where k is
determined by the level of desired anonymity) can be deter-
mined using Bayes’ theorem as follows.
Figure 2 Anonymity zone (Z) (location of source is unknown).
Intersection region
Figure 3 Interaction attack.
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the source of the message, then the anonymity zone (Z) be-
comes the union of the sensed region of the possible source
nodes and is larger than the ﬁrst case. For example, the ano-
nymity zone (Z) for two neighboring sensor nodes is shown
in Fig. 2. (Z) is larger than in the ﬁrst case. Thus, hiding the
identity of sensor node reporting the event can increase the pri-
vacy of an event of interest.
3.1.1.3. Intersection attack. The source does not know the
source of a message. However, multiple sensor report events
that occur in their vicinity by transmitting packets to the sink
over the network. These packets are routed toward the sink by
different nodes in the network. As the packets reach near the
destination, the routing paths may merge.
An adversary sitting at a particular location in the network
may receive messages from multiple sources. The possibility in-
creases if the adversary is near the sink. Different adversaries
may also communicate with one another over some private
channels. The adversaries are aware of the location of nodes,
and the occurrence of an event of interest is reported without
any delay. This process may allow an intersection attack by an
adversary that receives messages on a merged path within a
small time interval or by adversaries colluding to exchange
such information, which is shown in Fig. 3. The intersection
attack reduces the region of uncertainty and allows an
adversary to conﬁne the search for the event of interest to a
very narrow region.3.1.2. Case II: The adversary is unaware of the node deployment
A sensor node observes an event and transmits a message to
report the event to the sink. The broadcast is received by an
adversary who is in the communication range (Rc) of the sen-
sor node. The adversary estimates the rough location of the
sensor node from the received signal strength. Due to the
noise and variation in the signal attenuation in wireless chan-
nel, the node may lie in an annular region, as shown in
Fig. 4. Because a node can sense an event in a circular region
of radius (Rs), the event of interest can be depicted as an
annular region. When the adversary is unaware of a node’s
location, the possibility of pinpointing the location of an
event is quite low. If the adversary is not a one-hop neighborof the message source reporting the event, the uncertainty re-
gion becomes very large.
4. Proposed scheme
A WSN is a self-organizing ad hoc network in which sensor
nodes communicate over the shared medium via broadcast.
A node can receive the public keys of its neighbors and employ
a self-organizing privacy scheme by using a ring signature
(Tscha, 2009). A ring signature signiﬁes an anonymous signa-
ture generation without the revelation of the original signer. In
a ring signature scheme, a set of potential signers is assigned.
This scheme does not require a coordinator or initiator, unlike
a group signature (Das et al., 2013). The major difference be-
tween these two schemes is that the later requires an entity
called group manager, which predeﬁnes a group of entities
and distributes some various secret keys to them. Ring signa-
ture does not require such a coordinator, and rings can be
formed autonomously, in a self-organized way. In a typical
ring, all nodes are equipped with a pair of public and private
keys. A signer node produces a signature by using its own pri-
vate key to message itself and all the other public keys of other
nodes. The formalization of ring signature given in Yu and
Guan (2008) and is deﬁned as follows.
(a) Ring-sign (m, P1, P2, ..., Pr,s, Ss): With the public keys
(P1, P2, ..., Pr) corresponding to (r) ring members, along
with secret key (Ss) which is the s
th member (actual
signer) produces a ring signature (r) for the message
(m). The signer uses a probabilistic algorithm for the sig-
nature generation.
(b) Ring-verify: (m, r) The veriﬁer accepts a message (m)
and a signature (r) including all the public keys of
all possible signers if they are true, otherwise, the ver-
iﬁer rejects the message. Ring signature veriﬁcation is
a deterministic algorithm, which has three basic secu-
rity requirements.
(c) Signer ambiguity: The probability that a veriﬁer will be
unable to determine the real signer of a ring with size
(r), is greater than 1r
 
. Hence the anonymity in the ring
signature is limited, and can be computational or uncon-
AS
)
Figure 4 Anonymity zone (Z) (source location unknown).
232 A. Debnath et al.ditional. When the veriﬁer is a participator of the ring
and not the actual signer, it can guess the actual signer
with a probability no greater than 1ðr1Þ
 
.
(d) Correctness: When a signer correctly generates a ring
signature with any signature scheme, the veriﬁer satisﬁes
the veriﬁcation equation.
(e) Unforgeability: Ring signature poses the strongest deﬁ-
nition of unforgeability. Any non-ring member trying
to forge a ring signature, on behalf of other (n) ring
members, for which the non-ring member is not part
of the message and successful is negligible. Thus, mem-
bers who are not part of the signature cannot forge
any message. The property of the ring signature indi-
cates, that the size of any ring signature grows linearly
with the size of the ring, because the signature must
incorporate the list of ring members.
(a) Privacy of the data: The anonymous authentication
scheme based on each node (i) in the network is associated
with a pseudonym, which is the public key of the nodes work-
ing as authenticator as well as an identiﬁer. Every node (i)
sensing the event belongs to a ring (Ri), which is a collection
of ﬁnite nodes distributed over the network.
Let (R= {R1, R2, R3, . . ., Ri}) be the set of rings formed in
the network. After the occurrence of an event, the rings evolve.
Let (m) be the information related to an event and (N= {N1,
N2, N3, . . ., Nm}) be the neighbors (m< S), where (S) as set of
nodes deployed in the area. Each node (i e N) generates as ring
signature (r(m, P1, P2, ..., Pr, i, Si)), where (P1, P2, ..., Pr) are
the public keys of the nodes and (Si) is the secret key of the
node. The other nodes in the network verify the signature upon
receipt of (m, r). If the received signature at node (i) contains
(Pi), then node (i) outputs true and forward the message.
Otherwise, the node discards it. The signer remains anony-
mous throughout the network. The sensed object or event is se-
curely transferred to the sink through the nodes that are the
part of the evolved rings. Any entity that is not part of the ring
cannot gain knowledge about the information in the message.
Thus, this scheme fulﬁlls our goal of data privacy.
(b) Privacy of the event: Data are embedded into a message
that is encrypted; moreover the message is transferred via theformation of a ring signature, which helps the nodes to pre-
serve their identity. The source of the message is the signer
of the ring. The signer sends the message anonymously
through the ring formation. Thus, the identity of the signer
is not revealed. In our assumed scenario, the signer of the ring
is the node that senses the event or object. Because the signers
are anonymous, the location of the event remains undisclosed
to non-ring members. This scheme ensures the contextual pri-
vacy in terms of the location of the event or object.
4.1. Robustness of the proposed scheme
In this section, we will be discussing the expediency of our pro-
posed scheme against different attack scenarios. First, the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme against local adversaries
will be analyzed, followed by more powerful types of attackers,
called global adversaries.
(a) Against local adversaries: Ring signatures contain few
inherent properties that may favor adversaries to trace a node
and tamper with information. Because the anonymity sets are
different, two signatures generated by the same node are not
equivalent. Thus, ring signatures are unlikable. Furthermore,
the signer (Si) of a ring (Ri) is anonymous to an adversary, only
if the adversary is unable to detect that (i) is the ring owner. If
the public key of (i) is not used by any other ring in the net-
work, an adversary can conclude that (i) is the owner of the
ring (Ri) with very high probability. This situation is problem-
atic, where the local adversaries can compromise the node (i).
The probability that any other ring will use the public key (Ps)
of signer (Si) of the ring is negligible. Thus, a local adversary
close to the message source will not gain much information.
Nodes form the ring based on the event generated in the net-
work. Thus, redundant paths will lead to the sink from the
source. The redundant path may contain node (i) such that
(i e Rm) and (i e Rn), where (Rm) and (Rn) are two different ring
anonymity sets. An adversary trying to eavesdrop on the net-
work will be interested in zones that contain more trafﬁc ﬂow.
The nodes near the sink will have more trafﬁc. As mentioned
earlier, each node in the network will be part of some ring.
Thus, more nodes belong to more than one anonymity set will
be near the sink.
These nodes will be the targets of an adversary to learn
about the information ﬂow in the network. In this case, the
compromised node may give a false positive or false negative
response and will send message to the next hop. Because the
compromised node will be part of some ring, the downstream
nodes in the anonymity set can detect the adversary action.
(b) Against global adversaries: Global adversaries are as-
sumed to have more computational and communication
power. They can have more information than the local adver-
saries about the network, such as the ring formation pattern or
location of more trafﬁc ﬂow. They can also make the local
adversaries collude. Global adversaries can locate redundant
paths; by observing the trafﬁc pattern. We discussed how the
local adversaries can compromise a node and the detection
of such compromised nodes. We assume that global adversar-
ies will be interested in events that occur in the network. The
adversary sitting in a node common to different rings will at-
tempt to correlate the outputs, thus gaining access to one of
the upstream nodes. Thus, global adversaries can stage a cor-





Figure 5 Maximum number of independent nodes connected to
the sink node.
Table 1 Simulation environment parameters.
Parameters Value
Network area 100 · 1002 m
Number of nodes Variable (0–70)
Bandwidth 250 kbps
Physical layer model Log-normal shadowing
MAC protocol TMAC
Routing protocol Multipath rings routing
Simulation time 3600 s
Transmission power 57.42 mW
Radio model CC2420
Initial energy 18,720 J (2AA battery)
Application layer packet size Variable (2–4 kb)
Privacy in wireless sensor networks using ring signature 233the sensed data. However, multiple paths in the network report
the event to the sink. The probability of compromising all of
them is very low. Thus, the sink or the other downstream
nodes will receive multiple values from different paths. This
process will ensure that the downstream nodes conclude that
an attack has occurred in the network and that the event has
also been compromised.
In Fig. 5 of G(V, E), where each node has the same trans-
mission power, a node is adjacent to at most ﬁve independent
nodes, which serve as its neighbor. Considering a small portion
of a complete graph, node A will be surrounded by six depen-
dent nodes; nodes B and F are two of them. Node B will dom-
inate node A, node C, node F and node D. Similarly, node F
will dominate node A, node E, node B and node D. The angle
subtended at node A would be 60. However, if this angle is
increased by d (say), then this symmetry will not hold; nodeFigure 6 LatenB and node F will not remain connected. Hence, node A can
be surrounded by a maximum of 5 independent nodes.
5. Simulation results
Several simulations runs were performed to validate the pro-
posed scheme for resource-constrained sensor networks. The
results obtained from these simulations are promising and
demonstrate that our scheme performs well under different
network scenarios. We changed the node density, ring size,
etc, for each simulation and showed that using a ring signature
to achieve privacy is a robust scheme and satisﬁes the basic
needs of scalability and energy consumption in terms of
WSN. In this section, the validity of this scheme will be dem-
onstrated via simulation results that have been incorporated in
graphs. Based on Fig. 6, the maximum per node latency was
found to be 120 ms. The minimum latency is approximately
6 ms (Table 1).
We note that, the throughput is maximized when the la-
tency is minimized for a node. The application level per node
latency and throughput demonstrates the efﬁcacy of the
scheme. The cryptographic overhead will consume more powercy per node.
234 A. Debnath et al.for the encryption and decryption process. Thus, we analyzed
the energy consumed per node and thereby calculated the ex-
pected life time of the network under the proposed scheme.
The per-node latency and throughput for 70 nodes deployed
in a (100 · 100) meter area with ring size 3 is shown in Figs. 6
and 7 respectively, for a simulation of 7200 s. The ﬁgures show
that the maximum throughput of a node is 160 kbps, while the
minimum was 10 kbps. In Fig. 8, we plotted the energy con-
sumed by each node for a simulation with 70 nodes. The graph
shows that the maximum energy consumed per node is 6.6
joule, while the minimum energy consumed is 1.5 joule, for a
simulation time of 3600 s. The nodes that become part of the
ring signature consume more energy compared to other nodes;
due to the signature generation and veriﬁcation overhead. The
energy consumed per node increases, when the node is associ-
ated with an increased number of rings.
In Fig. 9, the expected lifetimes are shown by varying the
number of nodes deployed against without using a crypto-
graphic scheme and using a ring signature scheme. Computa-Figure 7 Throug
Figure 8 Energy cotion overhead is an inherent problem with any cryptographic
scheme, which impedes the maximum of the schemes. The
main challenge in the implementation of any cryptographic
scheme is the energy efﬁciency, because a considerable amount
of energy is consumed during cryptographic key exchange, dif-
ferent digest calculations, etc. We attempted to determine the
energy efﬁciency of a ring signature scheme by measuring the
expected lifetime in order to show the validity of our scheme
in terms of energy consumption.
We assumed that a network would be dysfunctional when
10% of the nodes die due to a lack of another concrete para-
digm of the network lifetime. We can see that the network life-
time for the ring signature is quite close to the lifetime without
any cryptographic overhead. This ﬁnding proves that our pro-
posed scheme can overcome the inherent overhead of crypto-
graphic schemes. The number of independent nodes in the
vicinity of sink was only ﬁve. As the messages from a group
of sensor nodes in a region move along different routing paths
toward the sink, their paths overlap. This overlap makes thehput per node.
nsumed per node.
























 Expected life time without cryptographic overhead
 Expected lifetime with ring signature scheme
Figure 9 Expected lifetime vs. node density.
Privacy in wireless sensor networks using ring signature 235messages vulnerable to correlation attack. The adversary can
ﬁnd the ring members common to different messages and
determine the original source node. Only two or three mes-
sages overlap within a small time. If the ring members are from
its own neighborhood and the numbers of signers exceed three,
the correlation attack fails to provide a unique signer. Ring
signature allows a sensor node to hide in the crowd of other
signers of the ring.
Ring signature provides unconditional anonymity to the
signing sensor node together with authentication of the signer.
This scheme conﬁrms the occurrence of the event of interest.
We showed that the signers in the ring signature must be cho-
sen from the one-hop neighbors of the signing node. The num-
ber of signers in the ring needs to exceed three to prevent
intersection attacks from global adversaries or adversaries near
the sink where different routing paths congregate. The size and
computational needs of the ring signature conﬂict with the re-
source needs of the sensor nodes and the throughput of the
network. Moreover, the signing and veriﬁcation delay become
important in delay intolerant or actuator networks. To deter-
mine the efﬁcacy of the proposed scheme, we performed a sim-
ulation-based study of the WSN. We observed that the
computational requirements for generating and verifying the
signature are well within the capabilities of nodes. The compu-
tation delay and end-to-end latency due to the signature over-
head is tolerable when compared to a raw network. Finally, we
also found that the optimal number of signers was near three
to four; this number prevents intersection attacks at points
where most of the routing paths merge and preserves the pri-
vacy of a sensed object.
6. Conclusion
An end user can be protected from taking a false action if the
message originates from an authenticated source, whereas
source nodes remain protected if the authentication technique
is preserves privacy. In a WSN, the trafﬁc analysis and header
information can reveal the location of a node. A ring signa-
ture-based authentication was proposed to preserve the pri-
vacy of a source node and obfuscate its residential region.
The ring signature provides anonymity to the source, and theother members that are chosen from its neighborhood provide
spatial anonymity. To balance the performance penalty due to
the increased message size and vulnerability to interaction at-
tacks by an adversary, the optimal number of signatures must
be near four, as suggested by the simulation experiments. The
experiments also indicated that the scheme provided privacy
and the performance penalty was negligible when optimal
numbers of signers were used in the ring signature.References
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